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Executive compensation has long been a hot topic for regulators, investors and the business 
press, usually because of a misalignment of performance and CEO compensation. CEO 
compensation is an important topic because it can have a major impact on firms’ ability to attract 
and retain talented CEOs. The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in 2010, and resulting updated 
compensation committee rules have increased the scrutiny of compensation committees as they 
set and monitor executive pay. Additionally, Hoitash et al. (2012) and Manchiraju et al. (2016) 
call for firms to include directors with financial or accounting expertise on their compensation 
committees to improve performance measurement and executive compensation contracting.  
Using the presence of a certified public accountant (CPA) on the committee to proxy for 
accounting expertise, I investigate the association between accounting expertise on the 
compensation committee and several aspects of CEO compensation. I find that the percentage of 
firms with accounting expertise on the compensation committee has doubled over my sample 
period. I find evidence that accounting expertise on the compensation committee is associated 
with increased pay-for-performance sensitivity when performance is measured using stock 
returns. However, in areas where accounting expertise should be most beneficial, including pay 
sensitivity to accounting-based measures of performance, and compensation shielding from 
misclassified negative special items, I find no evidence of a significant impact. This study 
contributes to the literature on CEO compensation and the literature on corporate boards and is 
the first large sample study on the association between accounting expertise on the compensation 
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Hoitash et al. (2012) and Manchiraju et al. (2016) call for firms to include directors with 
financial or accounting expertise on their compensation committees to improve performance 
measurement and executive compensation contracting. While there is some empirical evidence 
supporting this call, it is limited to very specific settings. For example, using a sample of firms 
that disclose internal control material weaknesses, Hoitash et al. (2012) find that compensation 
committee financial expertise is positively associated with the reduction of CFO bonus following 
an internal control material weakness disclosure. With a sample of oil and gas firms, Manchiraju 
et al. (2016) find that the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses on non-hedge derivatives 
(CEOs rewarded for gains, but not held accountable for losses) is lower in firms with an 
accounting financial expert on the compensation committee.  There has yet to be broad study that 
considers the impact of accounting expertise on the compensation committee. In this study, I 
seek to fill this void. Using a large sample, I examine whether the presence of accounting 
expertise on the compensation committee impacts CEO compensation.  
CEO compensation continues to be an important topic in the press and among regulators, 
and academics. “With the possible exception of major accounting frauds (e.g., WorldCom, 
Enron, etc.), there are few topics that are more pervasive and produce bigger headlines in the 
business press than executive compensation.” (Core et al. 2008) Consistent with this notion, a 
Factiva text search of Wall Street Journal articles for “executive AND compensation” over the 
past two years produces more than 240 unique articles, or approximately 2.3 articles per week. A 




yields roughly 2,000 peer reviewed articles published in academic journals during the last ten 
years. Since the passage of the Dodd-Frank act in 2010, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has implemented or proposed six different rules related to executive 
compensation, including requiring that firms have a fully independent compensation committee 
and that firms allow shareholders to have a “Say on Pay” vote at least every three years.1  
Notwithstanding the intense focus on executive compensation, the business press and 
academics have largely ignored the committee responsible for executive compensation. Daily et 
al. (1998) point out that much of the research on the impact of corporate governance on 
executive compensation focuses too broadly on the full board, and not the compensation 
committee. However, as pointed out in a recent Wall Street Journal Article, “If the CEO is 
Overpaid, Blame the Compensation Committee” (Prozen and Kothari 2017), it is the 
compensation committee of the board of directors that is responsible for setting CEO 
compensation. Hermanson et al. (2012) state that the research on compensation committees is 
still quite minimal and calls for future research on compensation committees. Consistent with 
these findings, if “Executive compensation” is replaced with “Compensation committee” in a 
similar EBSCO Host search fewer than 100 unique article hits are produced.  
Most of the prior compensation committee literature examines the impact compensation 
committee independence has on executive compensation. However, the major exchanges 
implemented compensation committee independence listing rules in 2003. These rules were 
strengthened in 2012 in response to the Dodd-Frank Act. As a result, independence can no longer 
be used as distinguishing characteristic of compensation committees, or as a good proxy for 
                                                 




compensation committee quality or monitoring. As highlighted by Hoitash et al. (2012) and 
Manchiraju et al. (2016) accounting expertise is another differentiating characteristic that may be 
important for compensation committees. 
 In most public companies, a significant portion of CEO compensation is based on the 
performance of the CEO or the firm, and performance is usually measured using accounting or 
accounting related information. Compensation committees with accounting expertise may be 
better at determining the appropriate measures of performance, as well as how performance 
measures should be used in determining CEO compensation. Prior research (e.g., Dechow et al. 
1994; Joo and Chamberlain 2017) documents that, on average, executives’ compensation is 
shielded from negative special items. Weaker pay sensitivity to negative special items 
(compensation shielding) used to encourage CEOs to make value-enhancing decisions that may 
reduce current earnings would be good for shareholders. However, compensation shielding may 
also be negative in other circumstances; for example, if the compensation committee shields 
compensation from core expenses that have been misclassified as negative special items (Joo and 
Chamberlain 2017).  Accounting expertise may help the compensation committee use 
compensation shielding when appropriate while also reducing shielding when it is not in the best 
interest of shareholders. 
In this paper I seek to answer the following research question. Does the presence of 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee impact CEO compensation? I use the 
presence of a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) on the compensation committee as a proxy for 
accounting expertise and consider several different aspects of CEO compensation. For 
completeness, I begin by testing for an impact of accounting expertise on the level of total 




stock grants, and option grants), and then investigate other aspects including the mix of 
compensation components (ratio of each component to total compensation), performance 
sensitivity of compensation, and abnormal compensation. Compensation sensitivity can be 
measured several ways. I follow Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1993) in testing pay for 
accounting performance sensitivity and pay for stock market performance sensitivity. I also 
follow Joo and Chamberlain (2017) and investigate whether accounting expertise on the 
compensation committee impacts classification shifting and compensation shielding.  
During my sample period (2003 – 2014) I find that the percentage of firms with a CPA 
on the compensation committee has been steadily increasing. In fact, it has more than doubled 
from 15.1% in 2003 to 31.0% in 2014. This finding suggests that firms may be heeding the call 
of Hoitash et al. (2012) and Manchiraju et al. (2016), but also highlights the importance of 
understanding whether accounting experts on the compensation committee impact CEO 
compensation.  
My tests suggest that accounting expertise on the compensation increases the pay-for-
performance sensitivity of CEO compensation when performance is measured as stock returns. 
However, I find no conclusive evidence that accounting expertise on the compensation 
committee impacts the level of total compensation or compensation components, the mix of 
compensation components, accounting-based pay-for-performance sensitivity, compensation 
shielding, or abnormal compensation. Given the call for firms to include directors with financial 
or accounting expertise on their compensation committees to improve performance measurement 
executive compensation contracting by Hoitash et al. (2012) and Manchiraju et al. (2016), and 




somewhat surprising. While I do find that CPAs do impact executive compensation, it does not 
appear to be in areas where accounting expertise should matter most.  
This study contributes the corporate governance and executive compensation literatures, 
by examining whether accountants affect firm decisions when they are outside of traditional 
accounting roles. Prior literature has called for firms to add accounting or financial expertise to 
compensations committees. My study is the first large-sample study to investigate the impact of 
accounting expertise on the compensation committees on CEO compensation. It also answers the 








 BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Compensation Committees and Related Regulation 
The compensation committee of the board of directors is responsible for overseeing 
executive compensation including compliance with regulation and disclosure. This oversight 
includes approving2 executive pay and reviewing and approving the Compensation Discussion 
and Analysis section of the annual proxy statement. SEC listing standards for compensation 
committees were last updated in 2012, in response to the Dodd-Frank Act. Listing firms are 
required to have all members of the compensation committee be independent.3 The updated 
standards also gave the compensation committee authority to hire compensation consultants and 
made the committee, not management, directly responsible for appointment, compensation, and 
oversight of the compensation consultants.  
While the Dodd-Frank Act and updated listing standards drew attention to compensation 
committees and committee independence, there was little actual change to the overall level of 
compensation committee independence. The mean percentage of compensation committee 
members classified as independent for my sample is 99%.  Prior to the SEC imposing 
compensation committee independence listing standards in 2012, both the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
System (Nasdaq) had already adopted listing rules related to compensation committee 
                                                 
2 Usually formal approval of executive pay packages is by the full board, but the compensation committee is 





independence. In November 2003 NYSE approved listing rules that required compensation 
committees to have at least one member, and that all members be independent directors. About 
the same time, Nasdaq approved listing rules that required compensation committees to be fully 
independent, if present, but did not require that listing firms had a separate compensation 
committee. For firms without a compensation committee, executive compensation was to be set 
by a majority of independent directors. Thus, while there have been regulatory changes related to 
compensation committees during my sample period, I do not expect these changes to affect my 
study.  
Compensation Committee Literature 
The vast majority of the compensation committee literature examines the association 
between committee independence and various aspects of CEO Compensation including: the level 
of total compensation, the level or percentage of compensation components, and compensation 
sensitivity. Daily et al. (1998) find no association between compensation committee 
independence and CEO cash compensation, contingent pay (bonuses, long-term incentive plans, 
and stock options), or total CEO compensation. Newman and Mozes (1999) also fail to find an 
association between compensation committee independence and the level of CEO compensation 
overall. They do, however, document that when insiders are on the compensation committee 
CEO compensation is much less sensitive to firm losses. Using a sample of IPO firms, Conyon 
and He (2004) find that total CEO compensation, and equity incentive structure are not impacted 
by insiders on the compensation committee. Anderson and Bizjak (2003) find very limited 
evidence of greater outside representation on the compensation committee being associated with 
more performance-based pay, but no association with compensation levels, the percentage of 




CEOs who sit on their own compensation committee. Although these findings do not provide 
strong evidence supporting the need for independent compensation committees, they do highlight 
the importance of considering more than just overall levels of CEO compensation. 
Vafeas (2003) finds limited evidence of insiders on the compensation committee being 
associated with higher levels of fixed CEO pay, and less contingent pay, but only during the 
early part (prior to 1992) of the sample period. Vafeas also finds that the number of insiders on 
the compensation committee decreased over the sample period but could not conclude that this 
decrease translated to net benefits for shareholders. While this study also does not provide strong 
evidence supporting the need for independent compensation committees, it does highlight that 
independence may no longer be a good distinguishing characteristic of compensation 
committees.  
In more recent work, Bebchuk et al. (2010) and Collins et al. (2009) examine the 
likelihood of the CEO receiving backdated options and compensation committee independence. 
They find no evidence of independent compensation committees being associated with a reduced 
likelihood of receiving backdated option grants. In addition to the fact that compensation 
committees are now required to be independent, these results also highlight the importance of 
considering factors other than committee independence when investigating compensation 
committees.  
Laksmana (2008) does not look at compensation directly, but compensation related 
disclosures, and finds that compensation committees that are larger and have more meetings 
provide better compensation disclosure. Compensation committee independence is found to be 




related study, Nelson et al. (2010) find that compensation committee independence is associated 
with improved disclosure compliance by Australian listed companies. 
Given the committee independence listing standards implemented in 2003, Sun and 
Cahan (2009) and Sun et al. (2009) take a different approach and include characteristics such as 
director co-option, director tenure, prior CEO experience, and committee size to create a 
composite measure of compensation committee quality.4 Sun and Cahan (2009) find that the 
association between accounting earnings and cash compensation is stronger for firms with high 
compensation committee quality. Sun et al. (2009) find that the association between stock option 
grants and future firm performance is more positive for firms with higher quality compensation 
committees. In summary, some of the prior studies on compensation committee independence or 
quality show compensation committee independence can be beneficial to investors, but others do 
not find significant differences associated with compensation committee independence.  
 Three prior studies consider financial or accounting expertise on the compensation 
committee. As an additional analysis, Dechow et al. (2010) consider whether CEO compensation 
is less sensitive to reported asset securitization gains when there is a financial expert on the 
compensation committee, but do not find any significant differences. The sample used to 
perform their compensation committee analysis includes only 303 observations and is limited to 
firms that reported asset securitization gains. By using a broad cross-section of firms, my study 
employs a much larger sample with more generalizable findings. 
 Hoitash et al. (2012) test the association between CFO compensation and the disclosure 
of an internal control material weakness. Using a sample of about 600 firms that disclose an 
                                                 
4 While I do not create a composite measure, I do control for director co-option, director tenure, prior CEO 




internal control material weakness, they find that CFOs are more penalized when there is a 
financial expert on the compensation committee. My study differs in that I investigate CEO 
compensation, not CFO compensation, and I do not limit my sample to firms that have had a 
material weakness allowing me to use a much larger sample of firms.  
Manchiraju et al. (2016) use a sample of 445 firm-year observations for 87 oil and gas 
firms to test the sensitivity of CEO compensation to derivative gains and losses. They find that, 
on average, CEOs are rewarded for both hedge and non-hedge derivative gains, but that their 
compensation is much less sensitive to derivative losses. They also find that financial accounting 
expertise on the compensation committee, reduces the asymmetric treatment of losses they 
document in their main tests. Again, my study is different because I use a much larger sample of 
firms, and do not limit my investigation to a single industry or single accounting issue.  
 Both Hoitash et al. (2012) and Manchiraju et al. (2016) suggest that firms should include 
directors with financial or accounting expertise on their compensation committees to improve 
executive compensation contracting, but the empirical evidence they provide is from limited 
samples with very specific firm situations (internal control material weakness, and derivative 
gains and losses, respectively). My study is the first to investigate the impact of accounting 
expertise on the compensation committee in a general setting with a large sample. 
Executive Compensation Literature 
In contrast to literature focusing on compensation committees, the executive 
compensation literature is quite large. Executive compensation is one of the most important 
contracting areas in the firm, because attracting and retaining a talented CEO can be critical to a 




compensation, researchers in several different business fields including accounting, finance, 
management, and economics have made significant contributions to the executive compensation 
literature.5 Edmans et al. (2017) identify two competing yet non-exclusive explanations for what 
drives executive pay – shareholder value maximization by boards (optimal contracting), and rent 
extraction by executives (managerial power). While optimal contracting has been used almost 
since the introduction of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), the managerial power 
explanation started receiving attention in the early 2000s as in Bebchuk et al. (2002). 
The empirical evidence from Hoitash et al. (2012) and Manchiraju et al. (2016) is most 
consistent with the managerial power explanation. They find evidence that compensation 
committees with accounting expertise better monitor CEOs. These findings would lead me to 
predict that accounting expertise on the compensation committee be associated with lower, more 
sensitive CEO compensation. However, Dechow et al. (2010) find no evidence that accounting 
expertise on the compensation committee improves monitoring. Additionally, Edmans et al. 
(2017), observe that the shareholder value or optimal contracting explanation is most consistent 
with the available evidence. Given the limited empirical evidence, and the lack of clear 
directional prediction from available theories, my formal hypothesis is started in the null as 
follows. 
H1:  The presence of accounting expertise on the compensation committee has no 
impact on CEO compensation.  
 
  
                                                 
5 Please see Core et al. (2003); Edmans and Gabaix (2009, 2016); Edmans et al. (2017); and Frydman and Jenter 






 SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample 
To perform my analysis, I use data from several sources. I obtain CEO compensation and 
ownership data from Execucomp, board and director data from Boardex, firm financial data from 
Compustat, returns from CRSP, and institutional ownership from Thomson Reuters. I restrict the 
sample to the years 2003-2014 based on Boardex data availability. To remove the potential 
impact of CEOs taking little or no salary, I delete observations where annual salary is less than 
$1,000 or with missing CEO compensation data giving me 22,168 firm-year observations from 
Execucomp. After merging with Compustat and removing observations with total assets less than 
one million dollars or with missing Compustat control variables, the sample is reduced to 12,590. 
Finally, I merge with Boardex and remove observations with missing Boardex control variables 
leaving me with a sample of 9,065 firm-year observations. Following prior literature, I drop 
financial firms and firms from regulated industries,6 reducing the sample to 8,245. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of firms with a CPA on the compensation committee by 
year.7 At the beginning of the sample period, in 2003, 15.1% of firms had a CPA on the 
compensation committee. Except for 2012 where there was a slight decrease, the percentage of 
firms with a CPA on the compensation committee increased each year of the sample. By the end 
of the sample period, in 2014, 31% of firms had a CPA on the compensation committee. This 
                                                 
6 2-diget SIC codes 49, 60-67.  




trend of firms adding CPAs to their compensation committee adds to the relevance of my 
research question. 
Table 1 presents the industry breakdown of firms, and the percentage of firms within 
each industry that have a CPA on the board as well as the percentage that have a CPA on the 
compensation committee.8 Over half the sample comes from five industries. However, 43 
industries are represented in the sample and several industries have more than 100 observations. 
About 60% of firms have at least one CPA on the board and of these firms, 40% have CPA on 
the compensation committee.  
As can be seen in Table 1, the presence of a CPA on the board, as well as on the 
compensation committee, varies across industries. The percentage of firms within the industry 
with a CPA on the board or with a CPA on the compensation committee in the top or bottom 
quartiles are denoted with a plus (+) or minus (–), respectively. Industries in the top quartile 
based on percentage of firms with a CPA on the board include Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 
(76.4%), Apparel and Accessory Stores (77.1%), Health Services (71.6%), Eating and Drinking 
Places (69.9%), Primary Metal Industries (75.7%), and Educational Services (81.9%). 
Interestingly, none of these industries are also in the top quartile based on percentage of firms 
with a CPA compensation committee, and surprisingly, two of these industries, Educational 
Services, and Eating and Drinking Places, are in the bottom quartile with only 11.9% and 27%, 
of firms with a CPA on the board that have a CPA on the compensation committee, respectively. 
The industries with the highest percentage of firms with a CPA on the board that have a CPA on 
the compensation committee include Measuring, Photographic, Medical, & Optical Goods, & 
                                                 




Clocks (44.7%); Oil and Gas Extraction (52.5%); Miscellaneous Retail (44.6%); Fabricated 
Metal Products (67.0%); Wholesale Trade – Nondurable Goods (51.7%); and Petroleum 
Refining and Related Industries (63.5%).  
The variation across industries in both the percentage of firms with a CPA on the board 
and the percentage of these firms that have a CPA on the compensation committee highlights 
that the generalizability of studies that employ samples from only one industry may be limited. It 
also highlights the potential contribution of a study that uses a sample from a broad cross-section 
of firms. This variation also suggests that, while correlated by construction, having a CPA on the 
compensation committee is not simply a function of having a CPA on the board. Firms that do 
not have a CPA on the board are not able to have a CPA on the compensation committee. 
Therefore, I only include firms with at least one CPA on the Board in my multivariate tests 
which gives me a final sample of 4,980 firm-year observations.9  
Methodology 
To test my hypothesis and answer my research question, I consider several different CEO 
compensation outcomes examined in prior literature that may be impacted by a firm having a 
CPA on the compensation committee. For completeness, I first examine level of total 
compensation and compensation components,10 and the incentive structure or mix of 
compensation components (Brockman et al. 2016; Humphery-Jenner et al. 2016).  Although 
CPAs have a reputation of being more conservative, and CPA Comp Committees may award 
lower overall levels of compensation or alter the mix of compensation components, there is no 
                                                 
9 My results are robust to including firms that do not have a CPA on the board in my final sample. 
10 (Black et al. 2014; Bradley et al. 2017; Brockman et al. 2016; Brunarski et al. 2015; Cai and Walkling 2011; 
Campbell and Thompson 2015; Carter et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2015; Core et al. 2008; Core et al. 1999; Gao and Li 




strong theoretical prediction as to how a CPA on the compensation committee may impact the 
overall level or mix of compensation components.  
A significant portion of CEO compensation is based on the performance of the CEO or 
the firm, and performance is measured using accounting or accounting-related information. I 
expect compensation committees with accounting expertise to be better at determining the 
appropriate measures of performance, as well as how performance measures are used in 
determining CEO compensation. Unfortunately, I do not have detailed information about the 
actual measures or calculations used in determining CEO compensation. However, prior 
literature has identified methods to measure pay-for-performance sensitivity. Differences in pay-
for-performance sensitivity can provide evidence that the actual performance measures or 
formulas used to determine compensation have changed. I investigate compensation sensitivity 
to firm accounting and market performance following Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan 
(1993). I also investigate Classification shifting and compensation shielding following Joo and 
Chamberlain (2017) and abnormal or excess compensation (Cai and Walkling 2011; Carter et al. 
2016; Core et al. 2008) as additional methods to test for evidence of a CPA on the compensation 
committee impacting CEO compensation. 
Compensation levels and component mix  
Following prior literature, I use the following model to test for an association between the 
presence of a CPA on the compensation committee and the level of total compensation as well as 
the level and mix of compensation components 11: 
COMPit = β0 + β1CPAit + β2ROAit + β3RETit + β4LN_TENUREit +  
β5CEO_AGEit + β6CEO_OWN_PCNTit + β7CEO_CHAIRit +  
                                                 




β8PCNT_CO_OPTEDit + β9COMP_SIZEit + β10PCNT_COMP_CEO_EXPit +         (1) 
β11AVG_COMP_TENUREit + β12BD_SIZEit + β13INST_OWNit +     
β14PCNT_INDit + β15LN_ASSETSit + β16LEVERAGEit + β17CAPXit + 
β18BOOK_TO_MARKETit + β19SEGMENTSit + β21STD_RETit + β22LOSSit + εit  
 
COMP is one of several dependent variables including the level of total compensation 
(LN_TOTAL_COMP), the level of the individual compensation components of salary, bonus, 
and equity-based compensation (LN_SALARY, LN_BONUS, and LN_EQUITY_COMP, 
respectively) and a measure of the level of total incentive-based compensation 
(LN_INCENTIVE_COMP) which is the sum of bonus and equity-based compensation.  
To test if accounting expertise on the compensation committee impacts compensation 
structure or the mix of compensation components, I also use the ratio of salary to total 
compensation (SALARY_TO_TOTAL), the ratio of bonus to total compensation 
(BONUS_TO_TOTAL), the ratio of equity based compensation to total compensation 
(EQUITY_TO_TOTAL), and the ratio of inventive based compensation to total compensation 
(INVENTIVE_TO_TOTAL) as dependent variables. The variable of interest, CPA, is an 
indicator variable set equal to 1 if a member of the compensation committee is a certified public 
accountant.  
Following prior literature, I also include several CEO and firm characteristic control 
variables that have been shown to be correlated with CEO compensation and could also be 
correlated with having accounting expertise on the compensation committee. I include return on 
assets (ROA) and annual stock returns (RET) as measures of firm performance. I control for 
several CEO characteristics as measures of the CEO’s power or potential to influence 
compensation. I include the natural log of CEO tenure (LN_TENURE), the age of the CEO 




for if the CEO is also the chairman of the board (CEO_CHAIR), and the percentage of 
compensation committee members that joined the board after the CEO took office 
(PCNT_CO_OPTED).  
As other governance related controls, I include the size of the compensation committee 
(COMP_SIZE), the percentage of compensation committee members with prior experience as a 
CEO (PCNT_COMP_CEO_EXP), the average tenure of members of the compensation 
committee (AVG_COMP_TENURE), board size (BD_SIZE), the percentage of shares held by 
institutions (INST_OWN), and the percentage of independent directors on the full board 
(PCNT_IND). Unlike much of the prior compensation committee literature, controlling for 
compensation committee independence is not necessary. While my descriptive statistics show 
that not all firms in my sample have fully independent compensation committees, the mean 
percentage of independent compensation committee members (PCNT_IND_COMP) is 99.0%. 
Over 95% of the sample has a compensation committee that is fully independent, and at the 
minimum, two-thirds of directors on the compensation committee are independent.  
Firm characteristics including size complexity, and uncertainty can also be important 
determinants in CEO compensation, and firm governance. Therefore, I include the natural log of 
assets (LN_ASSETS), firm financial leverage (LEVERAGE), capital expenditures (CAPEX), the 
book to market ratio (BOOK_TO_MARKET), the number of business segments (SEGMENTS), 
returns volatility (STD_RET), and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm experienced a loss 
for the year (LOSS). To remove the influence of outliers, continuous variables are winsorized at 
1st and 99th percentiles. For robustness I include firm- and year-fixed effects with 






 According to a study by Ernst & Young,12 pay-for-performance misalignment is a top 
driver of opposition in say-on-pay votes. I follow Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1993) 
in testing pay for accounting performance sensitivity and pay for stock market performance 
sensitivity. The estimated coefficients on my measures of accounting performance (ROA or 
ROE) and market performance (RET) from equation (1) capture the sensitivity of compensation 
to accounting and market performance respectively. To see if having accounting expertise on the 
compensation committee impacts the sensitivities of CEO compensation to performance I 
interact the performance measures with CPA.  
Significant interaction term coefficients would indicate that the sensitivity is different for 
firms with accounting expertise on the compensation committee. Assuming a positive association 
between performance and compensation, a positive interaction coefficient would indicate pay is 
more sensitive to performance, or stronger pay-for-performance alignment when there is 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee. I use the following model to perform my 
test: 
COMPit = β0 + β1CPAit + β2ROA(ROE)it + β3RETit + β4CPAit*ROA(ROE)it + 
β5CPAit*RETit + β6LN_TENUREit + β7CEO_AGEit + β8CEO_OWN_PCNTit + 
β9CEO_CHAIRit + β10PCNT_CO_OPTEDit + β11COMP_SIZEit + 
β12PCNT_COMP_CEO_EXPit + β13AVG_COMP_TENUREit β14BD_SIZEit +         (2) 
β15INST_OWNit + β16PCNT_INDit + β17LN_ASSETSit + β18LEVERAGEit +  
β19CAPXit + β20BOOK_TO_MARKETit + β21SEGMENTSit + β22STD_RETit +  
β23LOSSit + εit 
 






For my pay-for-performance sensitivity tests COMP represents one of several different 
dependent variables. I use the level of total compensation (LN_TOTAL_COMP), as well as the 
levels of performance-based individual compensation components bonus, and equity-based 
compensation (LN_BONUS, and LN_EQUITY_COMP, respectively). I also use total incentive-
based compensation (LN_INCENTIVE_COMP) as a dependent variable. For each dependent 
variable the model is run once using ROA as the measure for accounting performance, and again 
replacing ROA with ROE. Control variables and model specifications are as described for 
equation (1). 
Related to accounting performance, there is a significant stream of accounting research 
that decomposes earnings into its different components (e.g. Bernard and Stober 1989; Bowen et 
al. 1987; Dechow 1994; Dechow et al. 2008; Hribar and Yehuda 2015; Rayburn 1986; Sloan 
1996; Wilson 1986). While the majority of this research is concerned with how accounting 
information is compounded into stock prices, Natarajan (1996) takes a different approach and 
investigates earnings components as determinants of CEO compensation. He finds that earnings 
components provide incremental information for performance evaluation relative to aggregated 
earnings.  
Following Sloan (1996), Dechow et al. (2008), and Hribar and Yehuda (2015) I 
decompose earnings into cash flows (CASH) and accruals (ACC). I then replace ROA in my 
model with the components of earning and include interactions with CPA to test whether 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee impacts the relations between earnings 






COMPit = β0 + β1CPAit + β2ACCit + β3CASHit + β4CPAit*ACCit +  
β5CPAit*CASHit + β6RETit + β7LN_TENUREit + β8CEO_AGEit +  
β9CEO_OWN_PCNTit + β10CEO_CHAIRit + β11PCNT_CO_OPTEDit + 
β12COMP_SIZEit + β13PCNT_COMP_CEO_EXPit +            (3) 
β14AVG_COMP_TENUREit + β15BD_SIZEit + β16INST_OWNit + β17PCNT_INDit + 
β18LN_ASSETSit + β19LEVERAGEit + β20CAPXit + β21BOOK_TO_MARKETit + 
β22SEGMENTSit + β23STD_RETit + Β24LOSSit + εit 
 
COMP is one of several dependent variables, as described in equation (2) and control 
variables and model specifications are as described for equation (1). The coefficients of interest 
are β4 and β5, with significant coefficients indicating that the cash and accruals components of 
earnings impact CEO compensation differently when the compensation committee has 
accounting expertise. 
Compensation shielding and classification shifting 
Prior research documents that, on average, executives’ compensation is shielded from 
negative special items (Adut et al. 2003; Dechow et al. 1994; Joo and Chamberlain 2017). 
Compensation shielding or weaker pay sensitivity to negative special items may be used to 
encourage CEOs to make value enhancing decisions that may reduce current earnings but be 
positive for shareholders in the longer-term. However, prior research has also documented that 
CEOs manage core earnings by shifting core expenses into negative special items (Behn et al. 
2013; McVay 2006; Yun et al. 2010). Joo and Chamberlain (2017) find that, on average, 
compensation committees shield CEO compensation from correctly classified negative special 
items as well as negative special items that are the result of classification shifting. While some 
compensation shielding may be appropriate, it is unlikely that weaker pay sensitivity to 
classification shifted expenses is in the best interest of shareholders. If there is accounting 




Additionally, compensation committees with accounting expertise should be better at identifying 
classification shifted expenses and not shield CEO compensation for such items. 
Following (McVay 2006) and (Joo and Chamberlain 2017), I use the following predictive 
model of core earnings (operating income before depreciation expense and before special items, 
CE).  
CEit = α0 + α1CEit-1 + α2ATOit + α3ACCRUALSit-1 + α4ACCRUALSit +         (4) 
α5ΔSALESit + α6NEGΔSALESit + εit 
 
The residual from industry-year regressions is used as a measure of unexpected core earnings 
(UE_CE).13 If unexpected core earnings (UE_CE) is positive and the firm also recorded negative 
special items (NSI), then the unexpected core earnings are considered classification shifted 
expenses (CS). Negative special items (NSI) is either positive or zero. NSI is equal to (-1) x SPI / 
SALE (where SPI and SALE come from Compustat) if SPI is positive and zero otherwise. If 
both UE_CE and NSI are positive CS is equal to UN_CE, otherwise CS is equal to zero.  
 Prior to testing if the presence of a CPA on the compensation committee impacts 
classification shielding or compensation shifting, I validate the classification shifting measure. 
As in prior studies, I validate the classification shifting measure by regressing unexpected core 
earnings (UE_CE) on negative special items and firm- and year-fixed effects. 
 
UE_CEit = β1NSIit + FE + εit                         (5) 
 
                                                 





A positive and significant β1 coefficient is evidence of classification shifting, while a zero β1 
coefficient would suggest that expenses have not been classification-shifted and that unexpected 
core earnings are not related to negative special items.  
To test if having accounting expertise on the compensation committee impacts 
classification shifting, I add CPA to the model in equation (5) and interact it with NSI. 
 
UE_CEit = β1NSIit + β1CPAit + β3CPA*NSIit + FE + εit            (6) 
 
A negative and significant β3 coefficient would suggest that classification is reduced when there 
is accounting expertise on the compensation committee. If the joint test of β1 + β3 is equal to 
zero, this would suggest that expenses have not been classification-shifted and that unexpected 
core earnings are not related to negative special items when there is a CPA on the compensation 
committee. 
To test if accounting expertise on the compensation committee impacts compensation 
shielding, I follow Joo and Chamberlain (2017) and measure the pay-for-performance sensitivity 
of CEO compensation to earnings before negative special items (EBNSI), and negative special 
items (NSI) decomposed into the classification shifted and non-classification shifted 
components. NSI is decomposed by subtracting classification shifted core expenses (CS) from 
NSI to identify the portion of negative special items that are not classification shifted 
(NSI_NCS). I add CPA to the model and interact it with each component of negative special 
items. 
 
COMPit = β0 + β1EBNSIit + β2NSI_NCSit + β3CSt + β4CPAit +          (7) 




Negative and significant β5 and β6 coefficients would suggest that compensation shielding 
is reduced when there is accounting expertise on the compensation committee. Joo and 
Chamberlain (2017) only use one measure of CEO compensation (LN_INCENTIVE_COMP), 
but as in my other pay-for-performance sensitivity tests, COMP is one of several dependent 
variables, as described in equation (2). Controls are the same as in Joo and Chamberlain (2017) 
and include stock returns (RET) and negative stock returns (NEG_RET) as market-based 
performance measures. To control for operating performance risk, the standard deviation of 
earnings before negative special items (STDEBNSI) and the standard deviation of returns 
(STDRET5) are estimated using the past five years and included as controls. Investment 
opportunities (INVOPP) are controlled for using the average of the past five years market-to-
book ratios. To control for firm size, the natural log of beginning of the year total assets 
(LN_ATt-1) is included. As with the previous models, firm- and year-fixed effects are also 
included. 
Abnormal compensation 
While the level of CEO compensation can be quite high, it is the excess or over-
compensation that is particularly concerning to regulators and shareholders. Some of the more 
recent CEO compensation studies have begun to consider measures of abnormal or excess 
compensation. Following Cai and Walkling (2011); Carter et al. (2016); and Core et al. (2008), I 
use the following prediction model to measure abnormal compensation: 
 
LN_TOTAL_COMPit = α0 + α1RETit + α2RETit-1 + α3LN_MVEit-1 +  
α4ROAit + α5ROAit-1 + α6LN_SALESit-1 + α7BOOK_TO_MARKETit +          (8) 






For the prediction model, regressions are run annually using all firm-years with necessary 
data and include 2-digit SIC industry-fixed effects. Abnormal compensation 
(ABNORMAL_COMP) is equal to the residuals from these regressions. Once I have obtained 
abnormal compensation, I use pooled regression to see if accounting expertise on the 
compensation committee has an impact on abnormal compensation. I include my variable of 
interest (CPA) as well as other CEO and governance characteristics that may be associated with 
abnormal compensation in the following model:   
 
ABNORMAL_COMPit = β0 + β1CPAit + β2CEO_AGEit + β3CEO_OWN_PCNTit + 
β4CEO_CHAIRit + β5PCNT_CO_OPTEDit + β6BD_SIZEit + β7INST_OWNit + (9) 
β8PCNT_INDit + εit  
 
Because abnormal compensation is calculated using annual regressions that include 
industry-fixed effects, it is not necessary to include them in this model specification. I do cluster 
standard errors by firm to correct for potential non-independence of the error terms caused by 








 EMPRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 As discussed in the sample section, the percentage of boards with a CPA on the 
compensation committee had been increasing over time. Additionally, as shown in Table 1, there 
is significant variation across industries in the percentage of firms that have CPAs on the 
compensation committee. To exploit this variation, I perform some industry-specific trend 
analysis. For brevity, I only present the results for six of the industries represented in my sample. 
I include the two industries with the most sample observations (Business Services and Electronic 
& Other Electrical Equipment and Components), and the top two and bottom two industries 
based on percentage of firms with a CPA on the board that have a CPA on the compensation 
committee (Fabricated Metal Products and Petroleum Refining and Related Industries, and 
Educational Services and Paper and Allied Products, respectively).  
Figures 2-7 present the percentage of firms with a CPA on the board that have a CPA on 
the compensation committee by year as well as the average level of total compensation, salary, 
bonus, and equity-based compensation for the industry-year. As can be seen in Figures 2-7, and 
consistent with the other industries not presented, there are two clear trends in CEO 
compensation that are consistent across industries. First, the level of salary is very stable across 
industries and over the sample period. Second, the level of, and variation in, total compensation 
is primarily driven by equity-based compensation. Additionally, equity-based and total 





The percentage of percentage of firms with a CPA on the board that have a CPA on the 
compensation committee is generally increasing over the sample for the industries with the most 
observations in the sample but is much more variable for the other industries. Electronic & Other 
Electrical equipment & components (Figure 3), and Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 
(Figure 5) are the industries where the percentage of compensation committees with a CPA trend 
is most similar to the trend of total compensation. However, there are no clear trends in 
compensation levels that appear to be associated with trends in the percentage industry firms 
with CPAs on the compensation committee across the industries included in my sample.   
Summary statistics of the variables relevant to my analysis are presented in Table 2. The 
mean (median) compensation for CEOs in my sample was $4.9 ($3.4) million, with a max of 
$29.5 million in total compensation. On average, salary is the smallest component of 
compensation with a mean of $739 thousand, and a max of $2 million. The largest component of 
compensation, on average, is equity-based compensation with a mean (median) of $2.8 ($1.7) 
million and a max of $20 million.  
The average CEO tenure during my sample is approximately 7.5 years while the median 
is 5 years. The average CEO age is approximately 54 years old with the oldest being 84 and the 
youngest 30. The CEOs is also Chairman of the Board (CEO_CHAIR) for 47 percent of 
observations in my sample. CEO ownership percentage (CEO_OWN_PCNT) is very right 
skewed with a mean of 1.8%, but only1.1% at the 75th percentile and a max of over 26%. 
 As mentioned earlier, 40% of the sample observations have a CPA on the compensation 
committee. The median size of the compensation committee (COMP_SIZE) is 4 members with 
about half being appointed to the board subsequent to the CEO taking office 




percentage of independent directors on the compensation committee is 99%, while the minimum 
is 67%. About 12% of compensation committee members have prior experience as a CEO and 
the average tenure of compensation committee members is almost 8 years. 
 Table 3 presents univariate difference in means tests for firms without (CPA =0) and with 
(CPA=1) a certified public accountant on the compensation committee. On average, total 
compensation is about 12% lower for firms that have a CPA on the compensation committee and 
each of the components of CEO compensation is also lower for firms that have a CPA on the 
compensation committee. At only 7.2% lower, salary is the most similar while equity-based 
compensation (15.2% lower) is the most different. When looking at the mix of compensation 
components (ratios of the compensation components to total compensation), I also find 
significant differences between firms with and without a CPA on the compensation committee. 
Salary and bonus make up a larger portion of total CEO compensation, while equity-based 
compensation makes up a smaller portion of total compensation at firms with a CPA on the 
compensation committee. Though interesting, these univariate differences in CEO compensation 
and compensation components cannot simply be attributed to the presence of a CPA on the 
compensation committee. These relations will be tested with the multivariate testing that follows. 
The univariate statistics also show significant differences in governance and other firm 
characteristics which also could cause CEO compensation to differ between the two groups of 
firms. CEOs are slightly older and hold a larger percentage of company stock at firms with a 
CPA on the compensation committee. Compensation committees tend to be larger and have a 
higher percentage of members that were appointed to the board after the CEO took office at 
firms with a CPA on the compensation committee. However, boards tend to have fewer total 




average, firms with a CPA on the compensation committee are significantly smaller in terms of 
sales, assets, and income. They are also less leveraged. 
Multivariate Results 
Compensation levels and component mix results  
 Table 4 presents the results of my initial tests for evidence of accounting expertise on the 
compensation committee impacting CEO compensation (Equation 1). The dependent variables in 
Table 4 include the level of total compensation (column 1), the levels of individual compensation 
components (columns 2-4), and a combined measure of total incentive-based compensation 
(column 5). The coefficient on CPA is only significant in column 3. This suggests that 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee is associated with higher CEO bonus 
compensation. However, the impact is not large enough to cause a statistically significant 
association between CPA and the level of total compensation, or even the level of incentive-
based compensation, so I am hesitant to accept this as sufficient evidence that accounting 
expertise on the compensation committee impacts CEO compensation. As expected, firm size 
(LN_ASSETS) is positive and significant in each of the models. Interestingly, CEO ownership 
percentage (CEO_OWN_PCNT) has a negative and significant coefficient in four of the five 
columns.  
Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions of the compensation component ratios on 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) and control variables (Equation 1). 
The coefficient on CPA is not statistically significant for any of the dependent variables. Thus, 
there is no evidence that accounting expertise on the compensation committee impacts the 




percentage are positively associated with the ratio of salary to total compensation (columns 1) 
but negatively associated with the ratios of equity-based and incentive-based to total 
compensation. This is consistent with more powerful CEOs having a larger proportion of their 
salary fixed.  
Pay-for-performance sensitivity results 
Table 6 (7) present the results of OLS regressions of the levels CEO compensation and 
compensation component on the interactions of accounting expertise on the compensation 
committee and accounting performance measured as ROA (ROE) and market performance plus 
control variables (Equation 2). Surprisingly, the coefficient on ROA (Table 6) is only positive 
when the dependent variable is bonus compensation (column 2), the coefficient on ROE (Table 
7) is not significant for any of the dependent variables. This suggest that neither return on assets 
nor return on equity are important determinants of total, equity-based, or total incentive-based 
CEO compensation for firms that do not have a CPA on the compensation committee. The 
coefficients on CPA*ROA (Table 6) and CPA*ROE (Table 7) are also not significant for any of 
the dependent variables. Thus, there is no evidence that firms with accounting expertise on the 
compensation committee use accounting-based performance measures differently than other 
firms when determining CEO compensation. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on market performance (RET) is only significant when the 
dependent variable is bonus (column 2) in both Table 6 and Table 7. This suggest that market 
performance is not an important determinant of total, equity-based, or total incentive-based CEO 
compensation for firms that do not have a CPA on the compensation committee. However, the 
coefficient on CPA*RET is positive and significant for each of the dependent variables total, 




evidence that total, equity-based, and total incentive-based CEO compensation are more 
sensitive to firm market performance when there is accounting expertise on the compensation 
committee.  Joint tests of β3 + β5 (RET+CPA*RET) are also positive and significant providing 
evidence that stock returns is an important determinate of CEO compensation for firms with 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee.  
 Table 8 presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO compensation and Compensation 
Components on the interactions of accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) 
and components of accounting earnings (ACC and CASH) plus control variables (Equation 3). 
The coefficients on the interaction terms are not significant for any of the dependent variables. 
There is no evidence that the cash and accruals components of earnings impact CEO 
compensation differently when the compensation committee has accounting expertise. 
Compensation shielding and classification shifting results 
 Following prior studies on classification shifting, I validate the measure by regressing 
unexpected core earnings (UE_CE) on negative special items and firm- and year-fixed effects 
(Equation 5). Results presented in Table 9 column 1 confirm that the coefficient on negative 
special items (NSI) is positive and highly significant, suggesting that classification shifting is 
very likely and that the measure of classification shifting is valid. Column 2 of Table 9 present 
the results for my test of accounting expertise on the compensation committee impacting 
classification shifting (Equation 6). The coefficient on the interaction term CPA*NSI is not 
significant. There is no evidence that having accounting expertise on the compensation 
committee impacts classification shifting. 
 Table 10 presents the results for compensation shielding tests (Equation 7). To test for 




shielding, I interact CPA with the classification shifted (CS) and remaining portion (NSI_NCS) 
of negative special items (NSI). Using a sample period of 1995-2012, Joo and Chamberlain 
(2017) find evidence of compensation shielding with total incentive compensation as the only 
measure of CEO compensation. For my sample, I find evidence of compensation shielding 
occurring with respect to bonus compensation, but not total incentive compensation, or my other 
measures of CEO compensation. Joo and Chamberlain (2017) find that compensation shielding 
has decreased over time. As my sample period is from 2003-2014 this may explain why I only 
find evidence of bonus compensation being shielded but not total incentive-based compensation. 
The coefficients on both of the interaction terms are not significant for any of the dependent 
variables. This suggests that accounting expertise on the compensation committee does not 
eliminate or curtail the practice of shielding CEO compensation from negative special items in 
general or from the portion of negative special items that are likely the result of core expenses 
being misclassified as negative special items.   
Abnormal compensation results 
 In Table 11, I present the results of OLS regressions of abnormal CEO compensation on 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) and control variables (Equation 8). 
The coefficient on the variable of interest (CPA) is not significant. I find no evidence of 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee having any impact on abnormal CEO 
compensation. I do, however, find significant results for some of the other governance control 
variables. CEO ownership percentage is negatively associated with abnormal compensation, 
while compensation committee size and the percentage of institutional ownership are positively 






 While each member of the compensation committee should be a valuable contributor, it is 
also possible that the chair on the compensation has more influence than the other committee 
members. As a measure of robustness, I explore this possibility. I create an indicator variable 
(CPA_CHAIR) that is set equal to one if the chair of the compensation committee is a CPA. I 
replace my original measure of accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) with 
this new CPA_CHAIR variable and re-perform all my multivariate tests. In general, the results 
are very consistent with my primary tests and for brevity I do not tabulate the results.  
In my tests of compensation levels (Table 4 column 3), the coefficient on CPE is positive 
and significant. When CPA is replaced with CPA_CHAIR the coefficient is no longer 
significant. As mentioned in discussion of these results, the estimated impact of accounting 
expertise on CEO bonus compensation is not large enough to cause a statistically significant 
association between CPA and the level of total compensation, or even the level of incentive-
based compensation. As I did not consider this sufficient evidence, the fact that the results do not 
hold with CPA_CHAIR as the measure of accounting expertise do not change my inferences or 
conclusions. In all other tests replacing CPA with CPA chair did not affect whether my variables 
or interest were statistically significant or not. 
It is possible that CEO compensation and the decision to have a CPA on the 
compensation committee is endogenous. If the source of endogeneity is time-invariant, any 
potential bias will be eliminated by the firm fixed-effects in my models (Lennox et al. 2012). 
Another common approach to addressing endogeneity concerns is through instrumental variable 
(IV) methods (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). To implement an IV method, it is necessary to 




a CPA on the compensation committee in my study) but is exogenous or uncorrelated with the 
error term in my equations. 
As discussed previously, a firm cannot have a CPA on the compensation committee if 
there is not at least one CPA on the board. Additionally, the more CPAs there are on the board, 
the higher the likelihood of having at least one CPA on the compensation committee. As the 
board delegates responsibility over executive compensation to the compensation committee, 
CPAs on the board should be directly influencing executive compensation unless they are also 
members of the compensation committee. Therefore, I consider the lagged number of CPAs on 
the board as an instrument for having a CPA on the compensation committee and implement 
two-staged least squares (2SLS).  
2SLS results are presented in Table 12. Column 1 presents the first stage where CPA is 
regressed on the lagged number of CPAs on the board as well as all the control variables from 
equation 1. The F-statistic of 20.93 compared to critical values from (Stock and Yogo 2005) 
suggests that I have a valid instrumental variable. Columns 2-6 present the second stage results 
where the dependent variables are total compensation (LN_TOTAL), salary (LN_SALARY), 
bonus (LN_BONUS), equity-based compensation (LN_EQUITY) and total incentive-based 
compensation (LN_INCENTIVE). Different from the OLS results presented in Table 4, using IV 
estimation I find a negative and significant association between CPA on the compensation 
committee and the level of total compensation, but no significant association with bonus 
compensation. Similar to the OLS results the coefficient on CPA is not significant for the other 
dependent variables. In unablated results I also perform 2SLS estimation with the mix of 




Unfortunately, using 2SLS is more complicated in the context of my other tests where my 
variable of interest (CPA) is included in interaction terms. Taking fitted values from a first-stage 
and use them to calculate interaction terms included in the second-stage is considered a 
“forbidden regression.” All regressors, including interaction terms, in the second stage should be 
included in the first stage. It is technically possible to use the instrumental variable to calculate 
interaction terms that can be included as additional instruments in the first stage. However, this 
approach does not provide valid instruments for the interaction terms used in my models, so I do 








Executive compensation has long been a hot topic for regulators, investors and the 
business press. Often this is because of a misalignment of firm performance, which is frequently 
evaluated based on accounting information, and CEO compensation. Since the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank act in 2010, the SEC has implemented or proposed six different rules related to 
executive compensation and increased the scrutiny of compensation committees. Hoitash et al. 
(2012) and Manchiraju et al. (2016) call for firms to include directors with financial or 
accounting expertise on their compensation committees to improve performance measurement 
and executive compensation contracting.  
The prior research on compensation committees is somewhat limited and the 
predominant focus has been on committee independence. There has yet to be a broad study that 
considers the impact of accounting expertise on the compensation committee on CEO 
compensation. In this study, I seek to fill this void. Using a large sample, I examine whether the 
presence of accounting expertise on the compensation committee impacts CEO compensation in 
various ways. In answering my research question, I also answer a call by Hermanson et al. 
(2012) for more research on compensation committees. 
Adding additional relevance to my research question, I find that the percentage of firms 
with a CPA on the compensation committee has been steadily increasing for more than a decade. 
In fact, it has more than doubled from 15.1% of firms in 2003 to 31.0% of firms in 2014. Further 
investigation reveals that the use of CPAs on boards in general, and on compensation committees 




percentage of boards with a CPA are not the same industries with the highest percentage of 
compensation committees with a CPA.  
My multivariate tests suggest that accounting expertise on the compensation committee 
increases the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation when performance is 
measured as stock returns. However, I find no conclusive evidence that accounting expertise on 
the compensation committee impacts the level of total compensation or compensation 
components, the mix of compensation components, accounting-based pay-for-performance 
sensitivity, compensation shielding, or abnormal compensation. Given the call for firms to 
include directors with financial or accounting expertise on their compensation committees to 
improve performance measurement executive compensation contracting by Hoitash et al. (2012) 
and Manchiraju et al. (2016), and the fact that firms are actually adding CPAs to their 
compensation committees, these results are somewhat surprising. While I do find that CPAs do 
impact executive compensation, it does not appear to be in areas where accounting expertise 
should matter most.  
 Future research could investigate the impact of additional compensation committee 
characteristics on CEO compensation or consider additional compensation-related outcomes 
including disclosure quality or say on pay votes that may be influenced by accounting expertise 
on the compensation committee. It is possible that the relation between accounting expertise on 
the compensation committee and CEO compensation is more nuanced than I am able to detect 
using my measures. It is also possible that significant relations are more present in specific cross-
sections of firms such a material weakness firms as in Hoitash et al. (2012) or oil and gas firms 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definitions   
Variable Name Definition (Calculation) Source 
Compensation Components   
TOTAL COMPENSATION CEO's total annual compensation (= TDC1) Execucomp 
SALARY Annual Salary (= SALARY) Execucomp 
BONUS 
Annual Bonus (= Sum of BONUS and 
NONEQ_INCENT if reported under 2006 (post 
FAS 123R) SEC reporting rules, or = Sum of 
BONUS, NONEQ_INCENT, and LTIP if 
reported under 1992 SEC reporting rules) 
Execucomp 
OPTION_AWARDS 
Fair value of annual stock option awards (= 
OPTIONS_AWARDS_FV if reported under 
2006 (post FAS 123R) SEC reporting rules, or = 
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE if reported 
under 1992 SEC reporting rules 
Execucomp 
STOCK_AWARDS 
Fair value of annual stock grants 
(=STOCK_AWARDS_FV if reported under 
2006 (post FAS 123R) SEC reporting rules, or = 




Equity based compensation (Sum of 
OPTION_AWARDS and STOCK_AWARDS) 
Execucomp 
INCENTIVE_COMP 
Total incentive-based compensation (= Sum of 
BONUS and EQUITY_COMP) 
Execucomp 
Dependent Variables   
LN_TOTAL_COMP 
The natural log of total compensation (log 
1+TDC1) 
Execucomp 
LN_SALARY The natural log of Salary (log 1+SALARY) Execucomp 
LN_BONUS The natural log Bonus (log 1+BONUS) Execucomp 
LN_EQUITY_COMP 




The natural log of total incentive-based 
compensation (log 1+INCENTIVE_COMP) 
Execucomp 
SALARY_TO_TOTAL 








Ratio of equity-based compensation to total 




Ratio of incentive-based compensation to total 





Variable Name Definition (Calculation) Source 
ABN_COMP 
Residual from annual regressions of 
LN_TOTAL_COMP on returns in year t and t-1, 
ROA in year t and t-1 the natural log of market 
value of equity, the natural log of sales, the book 
to market ratio, the natural log of CEO tenure, 
and leverage (See equation 8) 
Multiple 
Governance Variables   
CPA 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is a CPA on 
the compensation committee (CPA designation 




Indicator variable equal to 1 if the chair of the 
compensation committee is a CPA (CPA 




Number of complete years the CEO has been in 
office 
Execucomp 
CEO_AGE Age of CEO in years Execucomp 
CEO_OWN_PCNT 




Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also 
the Chairman of the board 
Boardex 
COMP_SIZE 




Percentage of directors on the compensation 
committee that are independent 
Boardex 
PCNT_CO_OPTED 
Parentage of directors on the compensation 





Percentage of directors on the compensation 
committee that have prior experience as a CEO 
Boardex 
AVG_COMP_TENURE 
The average tenure of the directors on the 
compensation committee 
Boardex 
BD_SIZE Number of directors on the board Boardex 
INST_OWN 





Percentage of directors on the board that are 
independent 
Boardex 
Firm Characteristics   
SALE Annual Sales (SALE) Compustat 
ASSETS Total Assets (AT) Compustat 
LN_ASSETS The natural log of total assets (log AT) Compustat 
INCOME Income before extraordinary items (IB) Compustat 
ROE Return on Equity (NI / CEQ) Compustat 




Variable Name Definition (Calculation) Source 
ROA Return on Assets (IB / AT) Compustat 
LEVERAGE Leverage (DEBT / AT) Compustat 
CAPX_AT 
Capital expenditures scaled by total assets 
(CAPX / AT) 
Compustat 
BOOK_TO_MARKET Book to Market Ratio (AT / (LT+MVE)) Compustat 
SEGMENTS Number of Business segments Compustat 
RET Annual Returns from CRSP daily file CRSP 
STD_RET 
Standard deviation of daily returns over prior 12 
months 
CRSP 
LOSS Indicator variable equal to one if income is < 0 Compustat 
MVE Market value of Equity (CSHO * PRCC_F) Compustat 
LN_MVE 
The natural log of the market value of Equity 
(log MVE) 
Compustat 
DEBT Total Debt (Sum of DLTT and DLC) Compustat 
Components of Earnings   
ACC 
Total accruals, defined as the sum of the change 
in working capital and the change in noncurrent 
operating assets scaled by average assets 
(CHG_WC + CHG_NCO / ((AT - Att-1)/2)) 
Compustat 
CASH 
Free cash flows, defined as the change in the 
cash balance and the distributions to debt and 
equity holders (CHG_CASH + DIST_EQ + 
DIST_D / ((AT - Att-1) / 2)) 
Compustat 
CHG_WC  Change in Working Capital (WC – WCt-1) Compustat 
CHG_NCO  
Change in net noncurrent operating assets (NCO 
- LAG_NCO t-1) 
Compustat 
CHG_CASH  Change in Cash (CHE – CHEt-1) Compustat 
DIST_EQ  
Net distributions to equity holders (EQUITYt-1 - 
EQUITY + IB) 
Compustat 
DIST_D  
Net distributions to debt holders (NET_DEBTt-1 - 
NET_DEBT) 
Compustat 
COA  Current operating assets (ACT – CHE) Compustat 
COL  Current operating liabilities (LCT – DLC) Compustat 
WC  Working capital (COA – COL) Compustat 
NCOA  








Net noncurrent operating assets (NCOA – 
NCOL) 
Compustat 
NET_DEBT  Net debt (DLTT + DLC – IVAO) Compustat 
EQUITY Book value of Stockholders equity (AT-LT) Compustat 
   




Variable Name Definition (Calculation) Source 
Compensation shielding   
CE 
Operating income before depreciation expense 
and before special items deflated by sales 
(OIBDP/SALE) Compustat 
ACCRUALS Total accruals ((IB-(OANCF-XIDOC))/SALE) Compustat 
ATO 
Net operating asset (NOA) turnover measured as 
sales divided by average net operating assets 
(NOA = [(AT-CHE_IVAO) - (AT-DLTT-DLC-
CEQ-PSTK-MIB)], 
ATO=[SALE/((NAOt+NAOt-1)/2)]) Compustat 
ΔSALES Sales growth ((SALEt - SALEt-1)/SALEt-1) Compustat 
NEGΔSALES ΔSALES if less than zero and zero otherwise Compustat 
UE_CE 
Unexpected core earnings. The residual from 
industry-year regressions of CE on CEt-1, ATO 
ACCRUALSt-1, ACCRUALSt, ΔSALES and 
NEGΔSALES. See equation 4)  Compustat 
EBNSI 
Income before extraordinary items and results of 
discontinued operations plus negative special 
items deflated by sales ((IB+(NSI*sale))/sale)  
NSI 
Negative special items deflated by sales 
measured as positive values ((-1) x SPI / SALE 
if SPI is positive and zero otherwise) Compustat 
CS 
Estimated core expenses misclassified as NSI. 
(=UE_CE if both UE_CE and NSI are positive 
and zero otherwise) Compustat 
NSI_NCS 
The portion of NSI which is not classification 
shifted (NSI-CS) Compustat 
NEG_RET 
Annual stock returns if returns are negative and 
zero otherwise  CRSP 
STDEBNSI 
Standard deviation of EBNSI over prior five 
years Compustat 
STDRET5 
Standard deviation of annual returns over prior 
five years CRSP 
INVOPP 
Investment Opportunities (average of prior five-
year market to book ratios where market to book 
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APPENDIX C: Tables 
 
Table 1         
Boards and Compensation Committees with CPAs by Industry                 
SIC Description Total Obs. Firms w/ CPA on Board    Firms w/ CPA on Comp. Comm. 
    N N 
As % of  
Total Obs.  N 
As % of  
Boards w/ a CPA 
73 Business Services          1,154     694 60.1%   276 39.8%  
36 Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment & Components  955 583 61.0%   230 39.5%  
28 Chemicals and Allied Products     773 433 56.0%   176 40.6%  
35 
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer 
Equipment  721 460 63.8%   185 40.2%  
38 Measuring, Photographic, Medical, & Optical Goods, & Clocks 659 380 57.7%   170 44.7% + 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction     375 259 69.1%   136 52.5% + 
37 Transportation Equipment       245 138 56.3%   49 35.5%  
20 Food and Kindred Products     243 108 44.4% -  44 40.7%  
48 Communications        238 103 43.3% -  32 31.1%  
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods    225 172 76.4% +  75 43.6%  
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores     223 172 77.1% +  48 27.9%  
80 Health Services       204 146 71.6% +  61 41.8%  
59 Miscellaneous Retail       194 112 57.7%   50 44.6% + 
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, and Management Services   192 101 52.6%   38 37.6%  
34 Fabricated Metal Products      149 100 67.1%   67 67.0% + 
58 Eating and Drinking Places     143 100 69.9% +  27 27.0% - 
33 Primary Metal Industries      136 103 75.7% +  37 35.9%  
45 Transportation by Air      100 48 48.0% -  9 18.8% - 
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods    100 60 60.0%   31 51.7% + 
26 Paper and Allied Products     99 50 50.5%   8 16.0% - 
23 Apparel, Finished Products from Fabrics & Similar Materials 98 44 44.9% -  15 34.1%  
42 Motor Freight Transportation      96 66 68.8%   24 36.4%  
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries    95 52 54.7%   33 63.5% + 
25 Furniture and Fixtures      92 56 60.9%   22 39.3%  




Table 1 (Continued)     
SIC Description Total Obs. Firms w/ CPA on Board  Firms w/ CPA on Comp. Comm. 
  N N 
As % of 
Total Obs.  N 
As % of  
Boards w/ a CPA 
82 Educational Services       72 59 81.9% +  7 11.9% - 
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries    70 24 34.3% -  4 16.7% - 
 Industries with less than 70 observations 594 357 60.1%   127 35.6%  
Total 8,245 4,980 60.4%     1,981 39.8%   
+ (-) denotes percentage of firms in the industry with a CPA on the board or compensation committee is in the top (bottom) quartile. 
Table 1 presents the industry breakdown of firms including the number and percentage of firms that have a CPA on the full board, as well as the number and  






Table 2         
Summary Statistics                 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Compensation Components         
TOTAL COMP+       4,980  4,915.20 4,841.13 339.62 1,697.86 3,405.43 6,350.86 29,545.27 
SALARY+       4,980  739.80 316.35 211.31 500.00 690.30 939.80 2,000.00 
BONUS+       4,980  1,064.46 1,341.46 0.00 225.00 645.00 1,385.40 8,881.50 
EQUITY_COMP+       4,980  2,844.67 3,487.15 0.00 522.78 1,679.44 3,847.47 20,050.39 
INCENTIVE_COMP+       4,980  3,943.89 4,367.57 0.00 1,022.23 2,553.32 5,226.09 25,250.39 
Dependent Variables         
LN_TOTAL_COMP       4,980  8.09 0.94 5.83 7.44 8.13 8.76 10.29 
LN_SALARY       4,980  6.52 0.43 5.36 6.22 6.54 6.85 7.60 
LN_BONUS       4,980  5.70 2.50 0.00 5.42 6.47 7.23 9.09 
LN_EQUITY_COMP       4,980  6.44 2.92 0.00 6.26 7.43 8.26 9.91 
LN_INCENTIVE_COMP       4,980  7.45 1.91 0.00 6.93 7.85 8.56 10.14 
SALARY_TO_TOTAL       4,980  0.27 0.21 0.03 0.13 0.20 0.33 0.98 
BONUS_TO_TOTAL       4,980  0.22 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.31 0.74 
EQUITY_TO_TOTAL       4,980  0.47 0.26 0.00 0.30 0.53 0.67 0.92 
INCENTIVE_TO_TOTAL       4,980  0.69 0.23 0.00 0.61 0.76 0.85 0.96 
ABNORMAL_COMP       4,980  0.00 0.60 -1.80 -0.32 0.05 0.35 1.56 
Governance Variables         
CPA       4,980  0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CEO_TENURE       4,980  7.55 7.38 0.00 3.00 5.00 10.00 52.00 
CEO_AGE       4,980  54.17 7.19 30.00 49.00 54.00 59.00 84.00 
CEO_OWN_PCNT       4,980  1.80 4.36 0.00 0.13 0.36 1.14 26.40 
CEO_CHAIR       4,980  0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
PCNT_CO_OPTED_COMP       4,980  0.51 0.38 0.00 0.20 0.50 1.00 1.00 
COMP_SIZE       4,980  3.70 1.03 1.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 11.00 
PCNT_IND_COMP       4,980  0.99 0.05 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
PCNT_COMP_CEO_EXP       4,980  0.12 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.67 




Table 2 (Continued)         
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min P25 Median P75 Max 
BD_SIZE       4,980  8.93 2.07 4.00 7.00 9.00 10.00 18.00 
INST_OWN       4,980  0.76 0.20 0.00 0.66 0.80 0.91 1.00 
PCNT_IND       4,980  0.79 0.11 0.50 0.73 0.83 0.88 0.92 
Firm Characteristics         
ASSETS++       4,980  5,063.40 12,496.14 59.52 522.59 1,321.02 4,055.30 106,685.00 
SALE++       4,980  4,454.86 9,924.72 36.98 474.14 1,272.70 3,595.01 73,723.00 
INCOME++       4,980  278.98 876.65 -974.39 10.51 58.77 199.98 7,426.00 
ROA       4,980  0.04 0.11 -0.51 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.27 
ROE       4,980  0.08 0.40 -2.22 0.04 0.11 0.18 1.62 
RET       4,980  0.17 0.48 -0.72 -0.12 0.11 0.37 2.24 
EBNSI       4,980  0.07 0.11 -0.50 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.38 
NSI       4,980  0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.47 
CS       4,980  0.11 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 3.28 
NSI_NCS       4,980  -0.08 0.39 -3.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.28 
LEVERAGE       4,980  0.20 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.30 0.80 
CAPX       4,980  0.05 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.30 
SEGMENTS       4,980  6.13 4.76 1.00 3.00 3.00 9.00 27.00 
BOOK_TO_MARKET       4,980  0.64 0.26 0.15 0.44 0.62 0.82 1.34 
CASH       4,980  0.00 7.83 -42.43 -1.36 0.02 1.64 36.12 
ACC       4,980  1.00 4.57 -21.86 0.01 1.04 1.85 24.76 
INVOPP       4,980  2.12 1.22 0.88 1.31 1.74 2.48 7.54 
STDEBNSI       4,980  0.07 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 1.05 
STD_RET       4,980  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 
STDRET5       4,980  0.53 0.44 0.08 0.27 0.40 0.63 2.66 
NEG_RET       4,980  -0.09 0.17 -0.96 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LOSS       4,980  0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
+ and ++ indicate ‘000s and ‘000,000s respectively. 
Table 2 presents Summary Statistics. For variable descriptions please see Appendix. The sample period is 2003 - 2014. All continuous variables 




Table 3     
Univariate Statistics     
  CPA = 0 CPA = 1   
Variable Mean (N=2,999) Mean (N=1,981) Difference  
Compensation Components     
TOTAL COMP+ 5,164.101 4,538.385 625.716 *** 
SALARY+ 761.515 706.917 54.598 *** 
BONUS+ 1,103.240 1,005.742 97.497 ** 
EQUITY_COMP+ 3,028.334 2,566.619 461.715 *** 
INCENTIVE_COMP+ 4,163.825 3,610.925 552.900 *** 
Dependent Variables     
LN_TOTAL_COMP 8.159 7.974 0.186 *** 
LN_SALARY 6.549 6.474 0.074 *** 
LN_BONUS 5.760 5.598 0.162 ** 
LN_EQUITY_COMP 6.605 6.187 0.418 *** 
LN_INCENTIVE_COMP 7.560 7.285 0.275 *** 
SALARY_TO_TOT 0.257 0.287 -0.030 *** 
BONUS_TO_TOTAL 0.214 0.226 -0.012 ** 
EQUITY_TO_TOTAL 0.485 0.441 0.044 *** 
INCENTIVE_TO_TOTAL 0.700 0.669 0.031 *** 
ABNORMAL_COMP 0.016 -0.015 0.031 * 
Governance Variables     
CEO_TENURE 7.495 7.628 -0.133  
CEO_AGE 53.811 54.718 -0.908 *** 
CEO_OWN_PCNT 1.562 2.165 -0.603 *** 
CEO_CHAIR 0.483 0.460 0.023  
PCNT_CO_OPTED_COMP 0.498 0.532 -0.034 *** 
COMP_SIZE 3.549 3.935 -0.386 *** 
PCNT_IND_COMP 0.991 0.988 0.003 ** 
PCNT_COMP_CEO_EXP 0.130 0.117 0.013 *** 
AVG_COMP_TENURE 8.035 7.914 0.120  
BD_SIZE 9.261 8.418 0.843 *** 
INST_OWN 0.766 0.748 0.018 *** 
PCNT_IND 0.806 0.775 0.031 *** 
Firm Characteristics     
ASSETS++ 5,812.180 3,929.844 1,882.336 *** 
SALE++ 5,030.309 3,583.709 1,446.599 *** 
INCOME++ 309.343 233.013 76.329 *** 
ROA 0.040 0.042 -0.002  
ROE 0.085 0.073 0.012  
RET 0.166 0.173 -0.007  
EBNSI 0.069 0.068 0.001  




Table 3 (Continued)     
  CPA = 0 CPA = 1    
Variable Mean (N=2,999) Mean (N=1,981) Difference  
CS 0.118 0.104 0.014  
NSI_NCS -0.088 -0.079 -0.009  
LEVERAGE 0.203 0.187 0.016 *** 
CAPX 0.050 0.051 -0.001  
SEGMENTS 5.983 6.341 -0.358 *** 
BOOK_TO_MARKET 0.631 0.650 -0.019 ** 
CASH -0.074 0.115 -0.189  
ACC 0.948 1.075 -0.127  
INVOPP 2.141 2.079 0.062 * 
STDEBNSI 0.066 0.064 0.002  
STD_RET 0.026 0.027 -0.001 *** 
STDRET5 0.512 0.552 -0.040 *** 
NEG_RET -0.093 -0.091 -0.003  
LOSS 0.186 0.180 0.007   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; + and ++ indicate ‘000s and ‘000,000s respectively. 
Table 3 presents difference in means tests for firms without (CPA =0) and with (CPA=1) a 
certified public accountant on the compensation committee. For variable descriptions 
please see Appendix. The sample period is 2003 - 2014. All continuous variables are 





Table 4       
CEO Compensation and Compensation Components 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES PRED. LN_TOTAL LN_SALARY LN_BONUS LN_EQUITY LN_INCENTIVE 
CPA ? 0.043 0.014 0.268** 0.032 0.075 
  (0.162) (0.197) (0.030) (0.811) (0.355) 
ROA + 0.117 -0.008 2.945*** -1.052* 0.661 
  (0.413) (0.867) (0.000) (0.084) (0.157) 
RET + 0.012 -0.025*** 0.847*** 0.039 0.134** 
  (0.594) (0.000) (0.000) (0.706) (0.034) 
CEO_TENURE + 0.059** 0.074*** -0.141 0.082 -0.008 
  (0.037) (0.000) (0.174) (0.501) (0.919) 
CEO_AGE ? -0.000 0.003** 0.005 -0.028** -0.012 
  (0.950) (0.014) (0.672) (0.022) (0.154) 
CEO_OWN_PCNT ? -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.009 -0.065*** -0.051*** 
  (0.005) (0.000) (0.595) (0.001) (0.002) 
CEO_CHAIR + -0.010 0.033*** 0.138 -0.145 0.087 
  (0.757) (0.009) (0.286) (0.320) (0.375) 
PCNT_CO_OPTED_COMP + -0.151** -0.031 -0.089 -0.565* -0.219 
  (0.027) (0.201) (0.717) (0.073) (0.245) 
COMP_SIZE - 0.030** 0.001 0.096 0.117* 0.049 
  (0.048) (0.902) (0.125) (0.099) (0.205) 
PCNT_COMP_CEO_EXP ? -0.072 -0.038 -0.206 -0.310 -0.206 
  (0.368) (0.170) (0.513) (0.392) (0.356) 
AVG_COMP_TENURE ? -0.006 0.001 0.004 -0.036* -0.010 
  (0.195) (0.599) (0.826) (0.072) (0.428) 
BD_SIZE ? -0.006 -0.004 0.000 -0.020 -0.001 
  (0.596) (0.265) (0.992) (0.683) (0.967) 
INST_OWN ? 0.144 0.064** -0.143 0.282 0.300 
  (0.135) (0.028) (0.683) (0.509) (0.281) 
PCNT_IND - 0.148 0.114* 0.465 0.685 0.386 
  (0.418) (0.051) (0.496) (0.425) (0.432) 
LN_ASSETS + 0.418*** 0.135*** 0.530*** 0.971*** 0.610*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE ? -0.358*** -0.065* -0.173 -0.431 -0.430 




Table 4 (continued)       
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES PRED. LN_TOTAL LN_SALARY LN_BONUS LN_EQUITY LN_INCENTIVE 
CAPX + 1.191*** 0.105 0.035 4.979*** 2.535** 
  (0.001) (0.363) (0.981) (0.003) (0.019) 
BOOK_TO_MARKET ? -0.574*** -0.006 -1.218*** -1.274*** -1.175*** 
  (0.000) (0.805) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEGMENTS + -0.003 -0.000 0.019 0.012 0.005 
  (0.522) (0.911) (0.232) (0.534) (0.641) 
STD_RET ? 1.155 -0.755* -11.857** 3.859 1.078 
  (0.391) (0.082) (0.025) (0.540) (0.798) 
LOSS + -0.027 -0.021* -0.820*** 0.006 -0.234** 
  (0.433) (0.068) (0.000) (0.969) (0.024) 
       
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4,980 4,980 4,980 4,980 4,980 
R-squared   0.805 0.904 0.578 0.567 0.635 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust pval in parentheses) 
Table 4 Presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO compensation and compensation components on accounting expertise on the 
compensation committee (CPA) and control variables (Equation 1). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All 





Table 5     
Mix of Compensation Components    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SALARY_TO_TOT BONUS_TO_TOTAL EQUITY_TO_TOTAL INCENTIVE_TO_TOTAL 
CPA -0.012 0.009 0.003 0.013 
 (0.162) (0.272) (0.820) (0.215) 
ROA -0.031 0.208*** -0.119** 0.096* 
 (0.527) (0.000) (0.033) (0.068) 
RET -0.019*** 0.058*** -0.040*** 0.018** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) 
CEO_TENURE -0.006 -0.001 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.465) (0.881) (0.274) (0.157) 
CEO_AGE 0.002* 0.001 -0.003** -0.002* 
 (0.051) (0.151) (0.014) (0.084) 
CEO_OWN_PCNT 0.003** -0.001 -0.004** -0.005*** 
 (0.038) (0.478) (0.017) (0.003) 
CEO_CHAIR 0.011 0.018** -0.008 0.010 
 (0.244) (0.047) (0.536) (0.390) 
PCNT_CO_OPTED_COMP 0.038* -0.003 -0.031 -0.035 
 (0.061) (0.862) (0.276) (0.138) 
COMP_SIZE -0.006 -0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.188) (0.900) (0.524) (0.408) 
PCNT_COMP_CEO_EXP 0.023 0.014 -0.050 -0.034 
 (0.322) (0.546) (0.127) (0.208) 
AVG_COMP_TENURE 0.003* 0.001 -0.003* -0.002 
 (0.091) (0.310) (0.097) (0.226) 
BD_SIZE 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.871) (0.675) (0.695) (0.851) 
INST_OWN -0.058* -0.035 0.101** 0.068* 
 (0.059) (0.157) (0.014) (0.065) 
PCNT_IND -0.069 0.021 0.012 0.025 
 (0.205) (0.681) (0.877) (0.683) 
LN_ASSETS -0.071*** 0.000 0.072*** 0.071*** 
 (0.000) (0.989) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.067* 0.002 -0.029 -0.024 




Table 5 (Continued)     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES SALARY_TO_TOT BONUS_TO_TOTAL EQUITY_TO_TOTAL INCENTIVE_TO_TOTAL 
CAPX -0.338*** -0.156 0.530*** 0.379*** 
 (0.004) (0.137) (0.000) (0.003) 
BOOK_TO_MARKET 0.141*** -0.039** -0.136*** -0.176*** 
 (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEGMENTS -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.766) (0.412) (0.942) (0.485) 
STD_RET -0.105 -0.574 0.626 0.040 
 (0.812) (0.128) (0.289) (0.935) 
LOSS 0.015 -0.047*** 0.026* -0.020 
 (0.194) (0.000) (0.080) (0.116) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,980 4,980 4,980 4,980 
R-squared 0.635 0.527 0.551 0.622 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust pval in parentheses) 
Table 4 Presents the results of OLS regressions of the ratios of the different components of CEO compensation to total compensation on 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) and control variables (Equation 1). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 





Table 6      
Accounting (ROA) and Market Performance Sensitivities 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PRED. LN_TOTAL LN_BONUS LN_EQUITY LN_INCENTIVE 
CPA ? 0.036 0.282** -0.022 0.048 
  (0.269) (0.035) (0.877) (0.604) 
ROA + 0.230 2.992*** -0.856 0.780 
  (0.144) (0.000) (0.231) (0.140) 
RET + -0.023 0.866*** -0.108 0.054 
  (0.402) (0.000) (0.406) (0.486) 
CPA*ROA ? -0.249 -0.142 -0.338 -0.216 
  (0.228) (0.869) (0.697) (0.738) 
CPA*RET ? 0.083** -0.046 0.344** 0.187** 
  (0.012) (0.722) (0.024) (0.037) 
      
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4,980 4,980 4,980 4,980 
R-squared  0.805 0.578 0.568 0.636 
      
Joint Test β2+ β4=0  -0.019 2.850*** -1.195 0.564 
  0.923 0.000 0.127 0.360 
Joint Test β3+β5=0  0.06** 0.820*** 0.236* 0.241*** 
    0.031 0.000 0.062 0.002 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust pval in parentheses) 
Table 6 Presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO compensation and compensation components 
on the interactions of accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) and accounting 
(ROA) and market (RET) performance plus control variables (Equation 2).  All continuous variables 







Table 7      
Accounting (ROE) and Market Performance Sensitivities 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PRED. LN_TOTAL LN_BONUS LN_EQUITY LN_INCENTIVE 
CPA ? 0.031 0.297** -0.038 0.049 
  (0.337) (0.023) (0.782) (0.584) 
ROE + -0.012 0.182 -0.065 0.117 
  (0.680) (0.122) (0.608) (0.191) 
RET + -0.018 0.916*** -0.120 0.067 
  (0.515) (0.000) (0.356) (0.397) 
CPA*ROE ? -0.021 -0.057 0.012 -0.063 
  (0.717) (0.779) (0.957) (0.720) 
CPA*RET ? 0.076** -0.090 0.347** 0.172* 
  (0.022) (0.486) (0.023) (0.059) 
      
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4,980 4,980 4,980 4,980 
R-squared  0.805 0.575 0.568 0.636 
      
Joint Test b2+b4=0  -0.033 0.126 -0.054 0.054 
  0.535 0.470 0.780 0.740 
Joint Test b3+b5=0  0.058** 0.826*** 0.228* 0.240*** 
    0.037 0.000 0.072 0.002 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust pval in parentheses) 
Table 7 Presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO compensation and compensation components 
on the interactions of accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) and accounting 
(ROE) and market (RET) performance plus control variables (Equation 2).  All continuous variables 






Table 8      
Earnings Components Sensitivities 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PRED. LN_TOTAL LN_BONUS LN_EQUITY LN_INCENTIVE 
CPA ? 0.044 0.265** 0.032 0.070 
  (0.153) (0.034) (0.811) (0.397) 
ACC ? 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.001 
  (0.289) (0.816) (0.586) (0.841) 
CASH + 0.001 0.007 -0.000 0.002 
  (0.589) (0.242) (0.965) (0.528) 
CPA*ACC ? -0.002 0.012 -0.007 0.006 
  (0.697) (0.446) (0.677) (0.590) 
CPA*CASH ? -0.001 -0.005 0.006 0.003 
  (0.746) (0.577) (0.577) (0.648) 
      
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4,980 4,980 4,980 4,980 
R-squared  0.805 0.574 0.567 0.635 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust pval in parentheses) 
Table 8 Presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO compensation and compensation components 
on the interactions of accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) and components of 
accounting earnings (ACC and CASH) plus control variables (Equation 3). All continuous variables are 






Table 9    
Classification Shifting 
    (1) (2) 
VARIABLES PRED. UE_CE UE_CE 
NSI + 1.592*** 1.765*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
CPA ?  0.018 
   (0.635) 
CPA*NSI -  -0.391 
   (0.503) 
    
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Observations  4,980 4,980 
R-squared   0.294 0.295 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust pval in parentheses) 
Table 9 Presents the results of OLS regressions of unexpected core earnings (UE_CE) 
on negative special items (NSI) in column 1 (Equation 5), and on the interaction of 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) and NSI in column 2 
(Equation 6). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 








    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES PRED. LN_TOTAL LN_BONUS LN_EQUITY LN_INCENTIVE 
EBNSI + 0.254** 3.324*** -0.115 0.857** 
  (0.029) (0.000) (0.817) (0.010) 
NSI_NCS ? -0.047 -1.809*** 0.457 -0.373 
  (0.792) (0.001) (0.519) (0.432) 
CS - -0.039 -1.685*** 0.498 -0.421 
  (0.814) (0.001) (0.449) (0.338) 
CPA ? 0.058* 0.322*** 0.112 0.102 
  (0.061) (0.007) (0.395) (0.195) 
CPA*NSI_NCS ? 0.444 0.214 1.130 0.598 
  (0.104) (0.838) (0.306) (0.446) 
CPA*CS - 0.390 -0.004 0.907 0.563 
  (0.126) (0.996) (0.381) (0.455) 
RET + 0.069*** 0.648*** 0.162 0.167** 
  (0.009) (0.000) (0.160) (0.020) 
NEG_RET ? 0.188** 2.156*** 0.171 0.803*** 
  (0.021) (0.000) (0.641) (0.001) 
STDEBNSI - -0.225* 0.190 -0.448 -0.284 
  (0.094) (0.698) (0.439) (0.504) 
STDRET5 + 0.040 0.145 -0.029 0.119 
  (0.230) (0.234) (0.846) (0.198) 
INVOPP + 0.071*** -0.036 0.179*** 0.087** 
  (0.000) (0.496) (0.009) (0.047) 
LN_AT + 0.367*** 0.536*** 0.850*** 0.562*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4,980 4,980 4,980 4,980 
R-squared   0.798 0.564 0.557 0.622 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust pval in parentheses) 
Table 10 Presents the results of OLS regressions of CEO compensation and compensation components 
on the interactions of accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) and components of 
negative special items (NSI_NCS and CS) plus control variables (Equation 7). All continuous variables 





Table 11  

























Year FE Yes 
Observations 4,980 
R-squared 0.537 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust pval in parentheses) 
Table 8 Presents the results of OLS regressions of abnormal CEO compensation on 
accounting expertise on the compensation committee (CPA) and control variables 
(Equation 9). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 





Table 12       
2SLS CEO Compensation and Compensation Components    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CPA LN_TOTAL LN_SALARY LN_BONUS LN_EQUITY LN_INCENTIVE 
              
LAG_NUM_CPA_BD 0.056***      
 (0.000)      
CPA  -0.788* 0.156 -0.417 -2.023 -0.783 
  (0.058) (0.239) (0.789) (0.206) (0.459) 
ROA -0.022 0.214 0.006 3.029*** -0.780 0.903* 
 (0.750) (0.194) (0.900) (0.000) (0.224) (0.070) 
RET 0.003 0.014 -0.021*** 0.864*** -0.014 0.128** 
 (0.782) (0.558) (0.001) (0.000) (0.893) (0.047) 
CEO_TENURE 0.050*** 0.100*** 0.067*** -0.084 0.185 0.060 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.000) (0.524) (0.235) (0.527) 
CEO_AGE 0.001 0.000 0.002** 0.001 -0.025* -0.013 
 (0.290) (0.895) (0.026) (0.905) (0.050) (0.140) 
CEO_OWN_PCNT -0.001 -0.016*** -0.008*** -0.011 -0.068*** -0.057*** 
 (0.754) (0.004) (0.000) (0.524) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO_CHAIR -0.014 -0.016 0.042*** 0.154 -0.195 0.060 
 (0.406) (0.654) (0.001) (0.245) (0.200) (0.547) 
PCNT_CO_OPTED_COMP -0.175*** -0.285*** -0.003 -0.224 -0.896** -0.379 
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.935) (0.547) (0.043) (0.185) 
COMP_SIZE 0.118*** 0.128** -0.014 0.137 0.366* 0.144 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.383) (0.484) (0.072) (0.282) 
PCNT_COMP_CEO_EXP -0.001 -0.014 -0.038 -0.142 -0.142 -0.111 
 (0.978) (0.876) (0.178) (0.655) (0.705) (0.628) 
AVG_COMP_TENURE -0.014*** -0.018** 0.003 -0.001 -0.065** -0.024 
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.231) (0.971) (0.035) (0.239) 
BD_SIZE -0.048*** -0.043* 0.003 -0.029 -0.113 -0.032 
 (0.000) (0.056) (0.662) (0.735) (0.202) (0.584) 
INST_OWN 0.011 0.115 0.046 -0.155 0.169 0.246 
 (0.812) (0.280) (0.106) (0.661) (0.701) (0.384) 
PCNT_IND -0.189** -0.116 0.121* 0.329 -0.408 -0.013 
 (-0.046) (0.589) (0.073) (0.666) (0.664) (0.981) 




Table 12 (Continued)       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CPA LN_TOTAL LN_SALARY LN_BONUS LN_EQUITY LN_INCENTIVE 
LN_ASSETS 0.031* 0.425*** 0.127*** 0.509*** 0.999*** 0.591*** 
 (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEVERAGE 0.032 -0.255** -0.063 -0.153 -0.116 -0.201 
 (0.586) (0.048) (0.101) (0.719) (0.824) (0.534) 
CAPX -0.050 1.081*** 0.076 -0.472 4.838*** 2.390** 
 (0.778) (0.007) (0.507) (0.755) (0.006) (0.038) 
BOOK_TO_MARKET -0.016 -0.604*** 0.004 -1.222*** -1.494*** -1.195*** 
 (0.651) (0.000) (0.878) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEGMENTS -0.006*** -0.007 0.001 0.006 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.014) (0.141) (0.736) (0.749) (0.951) (0.900) 
STD_RET -0.514 0.869 -0.523 -10.162* 3.303 1.801 
 (0.452) (0.556) (0.237) (0.062) (0.609) (0.673) 
LOSS -0.006 -0.027 -0.020* -0.842*** 0.046 -0.226** 
 (0.694) (0.462) (0.087) (0.000) (0.770) (0.032) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,605 4,606 4,606 4,606 4,606 4,606 
F-Stat 20.93      
 (0.000)      
R-squared  0.026 0.305 0.163 0.009 0.074 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Robust pval in parentheses) 
Table 12 Presents the results of 2SLS regressions where the lagged number of CPAs on the board is used as an instrument for the presence of a 
CPA on the compensation committee. Column 1 presents the results for the first-stage regression and columns 2-6 present the results of second-
stage regressions where DVs and control variables are as in equation 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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